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Oliver Sacks wrote a marvelous essay, entitled The President's Speech, about
a ward of neurology patients watching a televised address by President Ronald
Reagan.' The patients, aphasiacs who could no longer "understan[d] words as
such,"2 laughed uproariously:
[T]he grimaces, the histrionisms, the false gestures and, above all, the
false tones and cadences of the voice ... rang false for these wordless
but immensely sensitive patients. It was to these (for them) most glaring,
even grotesque, incongruities and improprieties that my aphasiac patients
responded, undeceived and undeceivable by words.3
By contrast, a patient with agnosia, who could no longer follow tone or
feeling at all and so could process only the words themselves, listened "stony-
faced":
Deprived of emotional reaction, was she then (like the rest of us)
transported or taken in? By no means. "He is not cogent," she said. "He
does not speak good prose. His word-use is improper. Either he is brain-
damaged, or he has something to conceal."4
Sacks concluded by noting "the paradox of the President's speech": normal
individuals were fooled by a mixture of "deceptive word-use combined with
deceptive tone," while "only the brain-damaged remained intact, undeceived."5
Does this mean we should entrust political choice only to persons suffering
from various neurological impairments? Of course not. But The President's
Speech reminds us that much of our political discourse, for better or worse,
bypasses the conscious mind altogether, and that a large number of citizens'
views and choices are driven by a range of irrelevant factors and fortuities-such
as a candidate's height, whether he uses a nickname, or the format of the ballot.'
* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law School. I thank Viola
Canales for helpful comments and suggestions and Paul Hughes for his exceptional research assistance.
1. OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL TALES 80
(Summit Books 1985) (1987).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 78-79.
4. Id. at 80.
5. Id.
6. See Rebecca Wiseman, So You Want to Stay a Judge: Name and Politics of the Moment May Decide
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And yet, there's something discomfiting about the idea that voters may be
casting their ballots randomly or arbitrarily, without real comprehension of the
issues or of the candidates' positions. The idea that voting reflects the citizenry's
free and informed choices is central to the legitimacy of our political system.
Traditionally, the franchise was restricted to those considered capable of
responsible self-government. And while that category has expanded dramatically
over time, so that neither property ownership, nor race, nor gender, nor affluence,
nor literacy is any longer regarded as a legitimate basis for awarding or
withholding the right to cast a ballot,7 the system still excludes two large classes
of citizens who are considered to lack either the cognitive skills or the wisdom to
cast ballots-namely, children and certain incompetent individuals s
The aim of this article is to describe the interplay between the existing
constitutional and legal frameworks that govern the right to vote and the
distinctive problems faced by individuals with cognitive impairments,
particularly citizens suffering from age-related dementia. The number of such
citizens is large now and is likely to grow as the baby boomers move into old age
and life expectancies rise.9 The problem that these voters face is distinctive
because, unlike the groups whose claims largely shaped the current legal
framework, these voters' inability to participate is not primarily a function of
state policies of affirmative disenfranchisement. Rather, their exclusion is the
product of a combination of state omissions, private actions, and policies that, at
least until now, have been largely outside the scope of federal regulation.
Precisely because private actions play a particularly significant role in
cognitively impaired individuals' exercise of the franchise, their participation
implicates a set of constitutional concerns with the integrity of the electoral
process that have largely been rejected when it comes to other groups.
Your Future, 18 J.L. & POL. 643, 651, 653 (2002) (describing one study that found a massive advantage for
candidates using a nickname); Maureen Dowd, Where They Stand, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, § 9, at I
(reporting that the taller candidate won "in 18 of the last 22 [U.S.] Presidential elections").
7. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES (2000); Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71
U. CIN. L. REV. 1345 (2003) [hereinafter Karlan, Ballots and Bullets] (discussing historical restrictions on
voting).
8. For a recent survey of state laws regarding disenfranchisement of persons adjudicated incompetent,
see Kingshuk K. Roy, Sleeping Watchdogs of Personal Liberty: State Laws Disenfranchising the Elderly, II
ELDER L.J. 109 (2003).
In addition, nearly every state disqualifies convicted individuals who are currently incarcerated, and many
states extend this disenfranchisement to individuals on probation or parole. A handful of states continue the
traditional practice of lifetime disenfranchisement for individuals convicted of a crime. See JEFF MANZA &
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006). As
explained elsewhere, this practice, whatever its historical justification, can today be understood only as
punishment. See also Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate
over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004).
9. See Jason H. Karlawish et al., Addressing the Ethical, Legal and Social Issues Raised by Voting by
Persons with Dementia, 292 JAMA 1345 (2004).
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II. THE LocI OF POLITICAL EXCLUSION
There are at least three distinct points at which individuals are winnowed out
of the electoral process: eligibility to vote, ability to register, and ability to
actually cast a ballot and have it counted. At the first point, exclusion is almost
entirely a function of positive law. But at the latter two points, disenfranchise-
ment may be the consequence of state action, state inaction, private action, or a
combination of factors. The current legal tools available to respond to exclusion
depend critically on the source of that exclusion.
With respect to eligibility, in Minor v. Happersett, the Supreme Court
expressed itself "unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United
States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one. ' Instead, eligibility to
vote is defined in the first instance by state law, although the contours of that
state law are subject to a series of overriding federal constraints. Every state
limits the basic right to vote to adult citizens who reside within the jurisdiction."
The Federal Constitution, through various amendments, forbids exclusion on the
basis of certain factors. Some of those factors-such as race, sex, or payment of a
poll tax-are expressly proscribed.'2 Of particular salience to this Symposium,
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits denial or abridgement of "[t]he right of
citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote."' 3
While the amendment was enacted for the purpose of extending the right to vote
to younger citizens, 4 it also clearly prohibits setting any upper age on eligibility.
Other factors, such as durational residency requirements or restrictions to
propefty owners, are not expressly forbidden, but have been struck down as
violations of the Equal Protection Clause. 5 Moreover, because the right to vote
constitutes a liberty or property interest, government decisions that deprive an
10. 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875). Cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) ("The individual
citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and
until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members
of the electoral college.").
11. Two circumscribed exceptions are jurisdictions that allow legal resident aliens to vote in some local
elections (for example, resident aliens with children in the school system may participate in school board
elections) and jurisdictions that allow property owners to vote in some local elections. See SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 55-56, 61-62
(3d ed. 2007) (describing noncitizen and nonresident voting).
12. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV (race), XIX (sex), XXIV (payment of a poll tax). To be slightly more
precise, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits conditioning eligibility to vote in federal elections on
payment of a poll tax; the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
to extend this prohibition to all elections. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
14. See Karlan, Ballots and Bullets, supra note 7, at 1358-59.
15. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (holding that durational residence
requirements violate the Equal Protection Clause because the restriction does not further a compelling state
interest); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969) (holding that a property ownership
requirement to vote was not narrowly tailored and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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individual of that right also implicate the Due Process Clause.16 Finally, beyond
federal constitutional constraints, federal statutes, such as the Voting Rights Act,
further circumscribe state limits on the franchise.'7
However, some restrictions on the franchise are affirmatively sanctioned by
federal law. For example, a provision of the National Voter Registration Act,
which otherwise limits states' ability to remove a voter's name from the
registration rolls, explicitly exempts state decisions to disenfranchise individuals
"by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity.' 8
By contrast to many other advanced democracies, the United States does not
automatically enfranchise all eligible citizens. Rather, the burden remains on
individual citizens to register. Thus, the registration process may effectively
winnow out voters who are legally eligible to participate but who fail to register
properly. To be sure, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (the so-called
Motor Voter Law or NVRA) requires states to make registration applications and
certain forms of assistance available at various government agencies and to
design procedures for registration by mail. 9 However, not every individual
comes into contact with the relevant agencies and, with respect to registration by
mail, no affirmative government assistance is required at all. Moreover, in recent
years, a number of states have adopted restrictive voter identification
requirements as part of the registration process.2° These voter identification laws
often require aspiring registrants to produce various forms of government-issued
identification, such as current drivers' licenses, that many individuals-for
example, elderly citizens whose physical condition precludes their driving-may
lack.
16. See Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to
Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 562-68 (2001) (describing one version of how
procedural due process protects the right to vote).
17. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1994) (providing that citizens cannot be denied the right to vote
because of a "failure to comply with any test or device."). "[Tlest or device" means
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate
the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational
achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4)
prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class.
Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)(B) (2000). See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1973) (interpreting
the reduction-of-representation clause in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to permit disenfranchisement
of felons).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg to 19 73gg-10 (2000).
20. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 658-63 (2007) (discussing the
recent rise of voter identification requirements and the number of citizens who lack the requisite
documentation); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act,
57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 712-13 (2006) (discussing the recent rise of voter identification requirements and the
number of citizens who lack the requisite documentation). Tokaji has also posted a number of valuable
discussions of voter identification requirements and litigation on his blog, which includes a chart listing current
litigation. Election Law @ Mortitz, Major Pending Election Law Litigation, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election
law/litigation/index.php (last visited June 22, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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With respect to actually casting a ballot and having that ballot counted, the
electoral process operates under an even more motley patchwork of rules. While
some rules regarding election administration-such as the eligibility to cast an
absentee ballot rather than appearing personally at the polls during specified
hours on Election Day-are subject to uniform rules set at the state level, many
other rules are not. In most states, the actual conduct of elections is devolved
down to the county or municipal level. Those governments often select the
machines that will be used and create the ballot formats that voters will face.
Local governments select the polling places that will be used and train the
temporary employees (often little more than volunteers) who will staff them.2'
Each of these choices is likely to affect some voters' ability to participate.
Restrictive absentee voting rules, such as some states' requirement that voters
have their applications or ballots notarized, will prevent some voters from
requesting or casting ballots.22 The pervasive use of inaccessible polling places
may prevent many other voters from arriving at the polls. 23 The use of ballot
designs that are confusing or hard to read, or voting technology that requires
precise fine-motor coordination may lead voters to miscast or spoil their ballots.4
Poll workers who are unaware of voters' right to assistance or accommodation
25
may interfere with voters' ability to cast their ballots. Finally, rules that limit the
amount of time a voter can spend in the voting booth may prevent voters with
cognitive or motor disabilities from completing the voting process.26
21. For a discussion of local election administration, see Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the
Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 393
(2002).
22. The Federal Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (VAEHA) provides that
No notarization or medical certification shall be required of a handicapped voter with respect to an
absentee ballot or an application for such ballot, except that medical certification may be required
when the certification establishes eligibility, under State law--(I) to automatically receive an
application or a ballot on a continuing basis; or (2) to apply for an absentee ballot after the deadline
has passed.
42 U.S.C. § 1973ee-3(b) (2000). However, the statute clearly distinguishes between "elderly" voters and
"handicapped" voters. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee-6. Moreover, by defining "handicapped" to include only "having
a temporary or permanent physical disability," id. § 1973ee-6(4), it is unclear at precisely what point a voter
with cognitive impairments comes within the definition's scope.
23. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES: ACCESS TO POLLING PLACES AND
ALTERNATIVE VOTING METHODS 29 (2001), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02l07.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (finding that in the 2000 election, eighty-four percent of polling places had features
that could impede access for physically disabled voters).
24. The notorious combination of the butterfly ballot format and punch card voting in Palm Beach
County, Florida, in the 2000 presidential election is a textbook example of these more pervasive issues.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 58-63.
26. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-580(c) (2006) ("[A] voter shall not be allowed to occupy a
voting booth for more than five minutes when other voters are waiting to occupy the booth."); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 9-261(d) (West 2006) (giving each elector no more than two minutes to remain within the voting
machine booth); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-1-23-28 (repealed 1986) (allowing voters who are casting ballots by
machine no longer than one minute and voters using printed ballots no more than three minutes within the
voting booth).
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Independent of state action, private interference may also exclude citizens
from effective participation in the political process. Historically, many minority
citizens were subject to economic or physical intimidation. 27 Similarly, with
respect to elderly voters, there have been episodes over the years in which voters
living in institutions such as nursing homes have been victims of ballot tampering
by caregivers who filled out residents' ballots contrary to their expressed
wishes.28
At each of these stages, individuals with cognitive impairments may be
excluded from the system. For a relatively limited category, the source of
exclusion is formal disenfranchisement through state laws that render individuals
with cognitive impairments legally ineligible to vote. In eleven states, individuals
who are under guardianships are categorically prohibited from voting.29 However,
only a minority of individuals with cognitive impairments fall into this category.3 °
In many states, unless the court that appointed the guardian also specifically
determines that their impairments should disenfranchise them, even individuals
who are under guardianship are permitted to vote.
Nevertheless, there may well be another category of cognitively impaired
individuals whose inability to register is the product of intentional state
disenfranchisement. There is a long and sorry tradition in the United States of
line-level officials refusing to provide or accept registration applications from
disfavored groups.3' It is entirely possible that some registrars or other public
officials may make similar judgments with respect to particular individuals with
cognitive impairments. They may, for example, flout the NVRA's requirement
that they provide such individuals with the same level of assistance in filling out
registration forms that they provide with respect to their own agencies' forms.
They may determine that individuals who seem confused about registration
requirements should be discouraged from completing the process. It is
impossible, however, to know the extent of any such state action, since it would
be largely the product of individual officials' on-the-spot decision-making.
27. For accounts of this intimidation and retaliation, see, for example, CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE
BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND BLACK VOTERS 177-217 (1973); FRANK R.
PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965, 15-17, 23-26 (1990).
28. For discussions of cases and reports raising these issues, see, for example, Joan L. O'Sullivan,
Voting and Nursing Home Residents: A Survey of Practices and Policies, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 325
(2002) and Jessica A. Fay, Elderly Electors Go Postal: Ensuring Absentee Ballot Integrity for Older Voters, 3
ELDER L.J. 453 (2005).
29. See Roy, supra note 8, at 115-16. For a survey of state laws restricting voting by persons under
guardianship or various forms of institutionalization or treatment, see Kay Schriner et al., Democratic
Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 437, 456-72, tbl.2 (2000).
30. See Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect
of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931 (2007).
31. That tradition was particularly notorious in the South with respect to African American voters, and
prompted Congress to authorize the appointment of federal registrars to enroll voters in particularly recalcitrant
jurisdictions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973d (2000).
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A far greater source of effective exclusion, however, likely lies in
government policies that are not purposefully directed at excluding cognitively
impaired voters, but that nonetheless have that effect. Precisely because they are
impaired, such voters are likely to need various affirmative accommodations in
order to register or to cast their ballots effectively. They may be unable to read or
write, and thus may require assistance to understand the ballot and indicate their
choices. And if their cognitive impairments are accompanied by physical
problems-as will often be true of elderly voters-they may require additional
assistance in getting to the polls or in obtaining and returning absentee ballots.
The absence of sufficient affirmative accommodations may preclude their full
participation. Therefore, it is quite plausible to hypothesize that more individuals
with cognitive impairments are unable to vote because of governmental failures
to act than because of explicit disenfranchising policies.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, individuals with cognitive
impairments often depend on a range of private actors to perform various life
activities. Sometimes, these actors are family members or private caregivers.
Often these actors are institutions, such as nursing homes or assisted living
facilities. These private actors may serve as gatekeepers to the outside world.
Even if state law recognizes the eligibility of individuals with cognitive
impairments, provides registration or voting assistance to individuals who request
it, and makes polling places physically accessible, individual citizens must still
contact registration officials, request absentee ballots, and show up at polling
places. For many elderly individuals with cognitive impairments, these contacts
can be made only with the assistance of their caregivers. If those -caregivers
decline to provide that assistance, the formal right to vote will remain abstract.
Thus, the inability of cognitively impaired voters to participate fully in the
electoral process is often the product of a combination of state and private action
and inaction.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to vote is a (conditional)
fundamental right-that is, "'[o]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate,"'
the state cannot exclude qualified citizens from participating.32 However, the
constitutional right remains, at its core, a negative right protected only against
state interference. While Congress arguably can use its enforcement powers
under the various voting rights amendments to enact statutes that outlaw private
conduct,3 3 the amendments by their own force reach only government action.
32. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam) (quoting Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)).
33. It has never been squarely established that Congress's enforcement power under various voting-
related amendments can be used to reach private conduct. Federal statutes directed at private conduct, for
example, 42 U.S.C.A. § 197 1(b) (West Supp. 2006), generally contain a jurisdictional element that forbids
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Thus, to the extent that private acts or omissions are the real barrier to effective
participation by cognitively impaired individuals, the Constitution offers little
self-executing protection.
Even with respect to state-erected barriers, constitutional doctrine is
somewhat complicated. On the one hand, a long line of cases has held that
statutes restricting the franchise are presumptively unconstitutional, must be
subjected to "exacting judicial scrutiny,' '  and can be upheld only if "the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest."35 With respect to
the permissible reasons for excluding voters, the Supreme Court has specifically
rejected arguments for disenfranchisement that rest on how those voters might
make their choices:
"Fencing out" from the franchise a sector of the population because of
the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible. "The exercise
of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions,"...
cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political
views of a particular group of bona fide residents.36
More generally, although the Supreme Court once suggested that fairly
administered literacy tests might be constitutional because they "promote
intelligent use of the ballot,, 37 that decision antedated the application of
heightened scrutiny to restrictions on the franchise. The Court has both
subsequently upheld federal statutes barring such prerequisites3" and, applying
heightened scrutiny, rejected a jurisdiction's claim that it could limit participation
in school board elections to a subgroup of the citizenry that was more likely to
"understand the whys and wherefores of the detailed operations of the school
system" in light of "the ever increasing complexity of the many interacting
phases of the school system and structure. ' ' 9 Thus, the mere fact that some
citizens labor under cognitive impairments that preclude them from casting their
ballots in optimally intelligent ways cannot by itself justify disenfranchisement.
Regardless of our republican aspirations about citizens engaging in public
private activity in connection with elections at which federal offices are being filled. Thus, they may rest both
on Congress's enforcement power and on its plenary power under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, to regulate all
elections involving congressional candidates.
34. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969). See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 360 (1972); Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
35. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627.
36. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
See also Dunn, 405 U.S. at 354-60 (rejecting arguments in favor of durational residency requirements that
rested on claims about the desirability of ensuring that citizens understood, and shared, community values
before they were permitted to vote and noting that such requirements had often been used in the past to exclude
people who were outsiders or who had different political views).
37. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
38. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
39. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 631.
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decision-making, we have recognized since the time of the Federalist Papers that
voters will often behave selfishly, prejudicially, and irrationally.40 The fact that
voters who are cognitively impaired may not process information in a
sophisticated or entirely rational manner may separate them only in degree-if
even that-from the remainder of the electorate.
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has noted that states have the
ability "to preserve the basic conception of a political community. '4 ' Permitting
individuals with cognitive impairments so severe that they are unaware of the
very nature of the process in which they are participating to vote may undermine
that conception in two ways, one conceptual and one practical. As a matter of
democratic theory, courts might discern a difference between voters who intend
to express some preference-however that preference is derived-and voters
who have no conscious intention of expressing a preference designed to affect
electoral outcomes. As a practical matter, including within the electorate
individuals who do not understand the nature of voting creates a pool of potential
votes that might be cast by anyone with the ability to gain access to those
individuals' ballots-a species of vote fraud. Both preserving the political
community and preventing vote fraud have been recognized as "compelling
government goal[s]," at least in some circumstances.42 Last Term, for example, in
the context of discussing voter identification requirements, the Supreme Court
reiterated that "[a] state indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the
"41integrity of its election process.
Thus, the constitutional analysis of restrictions on the voting rights of
cognitively impaired individuals is likely to turn on the question whether state
restrictions are narrowly tailored to exclude only those individuals who are so
impaired that they lack the capacity to cast a vote that is meaningful to them."
Here, the Due Process Clause is likely to play a significant role. Once voting is
understood to be not only a liberty interest but a fundamental one, courts are
likely to insist that any deprivation of the right to vote be accomplished only
through procedures that satisfy the three-part procedural due process calculus of
Mathews v. Eldridge.46 Thus, rather than treating the category of cognitive
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
41. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 344.
42. See id. at 345.
43. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006) (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)).
44. For an early discussion of this narrow tailoring point, see Notes, Mental Disability and the Right to
Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979).
45. For more elaborations on the Due Process Clause, see Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47-49 (D.
Me. 2001) and Shane, supra note 16, at 562-68.
46. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explaining that determining the required process for depriving an
individual of a liberty or property right depends on considering three factors: (1) the private interest at stake; (2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the existing procedures and the probable value of additional
safeguards; and (3) the burden that additional safeguards would impose on the government).
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impairment as a unitary concept authorizing the disenfranchisement of all
individuals who are impaired to any degree, courts may well insist that states
develop clear procedures for deciding which individuals can be prohibited from
voting and for providing such individuals with the ability to challenge those
determinations.
While existing constitutional doctrine offers at least a relatively clear-cut
roadmap for challenging the affirmative disenfranchisement of cognitively
impaired individuals, the doctrine is decidedly less favorable with respect to
constitutional challenges to state omissions. A variety of state practices have the
effect, if not the specific purpose, of precluding full participation in the political
process by some identifiable groups of voters. Almost certainly, illiteracy will
make it more difficult for a citizen to participate in the political process. The
location of polling places and the restriction of access to absentee ballots
combined with the conduct of elections on weekdays during a limited number of
hours undoubtedly makes voting more difficult for less affluent voters.
Registration requirements themselves are likely to have disproportionate impacts
on less affluent and less educated voters, who will find it harder to navigate the
system. And although the Supreme Court has stated that "[w]ealth... is not
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process, '47 the
Court has never held that the states are obligated to counteract the effects wealth
has on an individual's ability to participate. Thus, it is doubtful, at least as a
constitutional matter, that a state's failure to modify its election procedures to
facilitate voting by persons with cognitive impairments would raise serious
constitutional difficulties. If citizens with cognitive impairments are to receive
affirmative assistance from the states, or if private actors are to face any
obligation to help them to participate, those duties will have to be imposed by
statute.
Finally, although the Twenty-Sixth Amendment expressly prohibits denial or
abridgement of the right to vote "on account of age, 4 that amendment is
unlikely to play a major role in protecting the rights of older citizens. The
structure of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment parallels that of the Fifteenth, which
prohibits denial or abridgement of the right to vote "on account of race. '49 That
amendment has been interpreted to prohibit express racial classifications, as well
as the use of facially neutral criteria that are adopted or maintained for the
purpose of disenfranchising racial minorities,0 but it has not been interpreted to
47. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
50. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (concluding that changing city
boundaries to eliminate minority voters is unconstitutional); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (holding that
an alternative to a "grandfather clause" is invalid under the Fifteenth Amendment because the alternative
operated unfairly against the class that the amendment was meant to protect); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915) (holding that an Oklahoma grandfather clause was void because it violated the Fifteenth
Amendment).
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reach practices that have an adverse impact absent a discriminatory purpose.
Thus, a state practice that expressly subjected older citizens to criteria that were
not applied to younger citizens-for example, a voter competency exam required
of all individuals over the age of i arguably violate the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment. So too, administrative practices that treated older
voters differently would raise concerns under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. But
the use of practices that have an adverse, but not intended, effect on older voters
would not, by itself, cause constitutional difficulties under the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment.
IV. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS
Congress possesses essentially plenary power under the Elections Clause of
Article I, Section 4 to regulate every aspect of the electoral process for federal
elections. In Cook v. Gralike,52 the Court stated that the clause "encompasses
matters like 'notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters,
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors
and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns. ' '5 3 The clause
gives Congress the power to override state policies regarding these matters with
respect to any election in which congressional offices, as well as state or local
races, appear on the ballot.54 As a practical matter, this power over mixed
elections gives Congress leverage over the electoral process as a whole, since
few jurisdictions can afford to run dual election systems.55
In the past forty years, Congress has used its Article I power to enact a series
of laws protecting voting rights against various forms of state interference. Each
of these laws contains some provisions that might bear on the voting rights of
cognitively disabled individuals. At least so far, however, there has been little, if
any, judicial elaboration of these individuals' rights.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was designed largely to enfranchise and
protect the voting rights of minority voters. Most of the Act's substantive
provisions are expressly race-conscious in that they forbid the use of voting
practices, procedures, or prerequisites to voting that are adopted for racially
51. Compare some states' practice of imposing more restrictive procedures for renewing the drivers'
licenses of older residents. See Jennifer L. Klein, Note, Elderly Drivers: The Need for Tailored License Renewal
Procedures, 3 ELDER L.J. 309, 320-28 (1995).
52. 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
53. Id. at 523-24 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)).
54. See In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); see also Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (discussing
Congress's preemptive power).
55. Section 2 of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment also gives Congress broad enforcement powers with
regard to the voting rights of older Americans. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 2. Cf Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5
Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1, 10-16 (2007)
(explaining the broad scope of the Fifteenth Amendment's identically worded enforcement clause).
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discriminatory purposes or that have racially disparate impacts. 6 But Section 208
sweeps more broadly, providing, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny voter who requires
assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write
may be given assistance by a person of the voter's choice."'" Thus, to the extent
that a voter's cognitive impairment affects his or-her ability to read or write, the
voter can receive help in voting. But note that Section 208, like the constitutional
protections discussed in the prior section, is phrased in essentially negative terms;
it prohibits state interference with voters receiving help from people they
choose-presumably people who are willing to assist them. It provides no
additional guarantee of assistance and imposes no duty to assist.
Yet another series of statutes deal more explicitly with the voting rights of
citizens with disabilities. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides
that "no otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability," be denied access to any program receiving federal
financial assistance. Similarly, Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA), passed in 1991, prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals in
the provision of public "services, programs, or activities." 8 And in a more
affirmative vein, the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of
1984 requires jurisdictions either to make polling places for federal elections
accessible to voters with disabilities or to provide disabled individuals with
alternative ways of voting, such as absentee ballots. 9 Finally, administrative
regulations governing long-term care facilities that participate in the Federal
Medicare program provide that residents have the "right to a dignified existence,
self-determination, and communication with and access to persons and services
inside and outside the facility" and require that facilities "protect and promote the
rights of each resident, including .... the right to exercise his or her rights as
a ... citizen.., of the United States." 6° Facilities are forbidden from "inter-
ference, coercion, discrimination, and reprisal" with respect to these rights.6'
While courts in recent years have uniformly held voting to be an activity
falling within Title I of the ADA6--the statutory provision with the most
56. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (2000).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6. However, Section 208 does impose one restriction: it precludes assistance by
"the voter's employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter's union." Id. This restriction is
clearly designed to prevent undue influence on a voter's choice.
More generally, other provisions of the Act first suspended-initially in only a specified set of
jurisdictions and later temporarily, before becoming nationwide and permanent-the use of literacy or good
character tests for voter eligibility. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee to 1973-ee6.
60. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(a)(1) (2006).
61. Id. § 483.10(a)(2).
62. For an extensive discussion of the ADA and voting rights, see Michael E. Waterstone, Lane,
Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 793 (2005).
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plaintiff-friendly enforcement mechanism -it is unclear that the Act has
significantly reduced barriers to participation, particularly by cognitively
impaired citizens. Studies have found states pervasively in violation of the ADA.
In 2000, the General Accounting Office found that more than eighty percent of
polling places had features that could impede access for physically disabled
voters. 64 Although the Help America Vote Act of 20026 provides states with
potential funding to make polling places accessible, 6 it provides no express
private right of action, 6' and thus little leverage for enforcement.
While the ADA does at least hold out the potential for requiring states to
make modifications and offer assistance to respond to physical barriers that bar
cognitively impaired individuals from full participation, its results, at least so far,
have been less salutary with respect to the more cognitively-related barriers. Of
particular salience to voters with mental disabilities, ADA suits involving
challenges to election procedures that fail to provide disabled voters with the
opportunity to cast their votes secretly and independently have been met with
only mixed success.68 Indeed, beyond general criminal prohibitions on fraud or
intimidation, disabled voters enjoy little, if any, additional protection of their
ability to cast votes without outside interference.69
More significantly, in light of the interactive effect of state and private
action, none of the federal statutes enacted so far have placed any clear
obligations on private actors, as opposed to government entities. Thus, they do
little to address situations in which caregivers either fail to provide cognitively
impaired individuals with information about upcoming elections or affirmatively
prevent them from participating-by, for example, refusing to help them request
absentee ballot forms or refusing to take them to the polls. While jurisdictions are
obligated to modify their programs to eliminate government-created barriers and
to assist individuals who request accommodations, the Act has not yet been
construed to place the more affirmative obligation on private individuals to
actually seek out disabled individuals to see whether they want to participate.
Unless and until the Act is construed to impose such duties, many cognitively
impaired individuals will not benefit from its provisions.
63. By contrast to the ADA, the Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act has occasioned little
litigation, perhaps because its enforcement machinery both requires forty-five days notice before filing suit and
fails to provide for attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee-4(a)-(c).
64. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 23, at 29.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (Supp. 2004).
66. See id. § 15301(b)(1)(G).
67. The subchapter of HAVA dealing with enforcement, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15511, 15512 (2006), refers only
to enforcement by the Attorney General and through state-based administrative processes. In the one reported
court of appeals case, however, the court held that some of HAVA's provisions could be enforced through
lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at least with respect to injunctive relief. See Sandusky County
Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2004).
68. See Waterstone, supra note 62, at 832-33.
69. See Fay, supra note 28, at 471.
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A number of states have enacted various provisions explicitly dealing with
voting by individuals in nursing homes and other institutional settings.7 Few of
these provisions, however, impose mandatory duties on caregivers, as opposed to
simply setting out protocols for dealing with resident- or institution-generated
requests.7 ' Thus, these provisions leave unaddressed the same problems largely
ignored by federal law-namely, the interaction of public and private barriers to
full participation. In a recent paper, we discovered that long-term care facilities
vary widely with respect to their understanding of the legal prerequisites to
voting as well as their own activities with regard to enhancing or deterring
residents' participation.72 The current system provides long-term care facilities
with little clear guidance as to obligations beyond noninterference in residents'
independent participation in the political process.
V. CONCLUSION
The ability of individuals with cognitive impairments to participate fully and
meaningfully in the political process raises issues that fall both inside and outside
the already developed constitutional and statutory frameworks for dealing with
voting rights. Fully vindicating their interests requires going beyond the
conventional elimination of state-created barriers to effective participation to
reach privately created or maintained obstacles as well. The participation of
individuals with cognitive impairments raises questions of how to balance their
interest in participation, both internally-in order to enable them to exercise
independent choice and avoid undue influence or coercion-and externally
against the broader public interest in maintaining the integrity of the electoral
process as a whole.
70. For an extensive discussion of provisions dealing with voting in nursing homes and other
institutional settings, see Amy Smith & Charles P. Sabatino, Voting by Residents of Nursing Homes and
Assisted Living Facilities: State Law Accommodations, 26 BIFOCAL 1, 1 (2004).
71. Id. at 2.
72. See Jason H. Karlawish et al., Identifting the Barriers and Challenges to Voting by Residents in
Nursing Homes and Assisted Living Settings, 20 J. AGING & SOC. POL'Y (forthcoming 2007).
